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Abstract
Anticipatory emotions precede behavioral outcomes and provide a means to infer interactions
between emotional and cognitive processes. A number of theories hold that anticipatory emotions
serve as inputs to the decision process and code the value or risk associated with a stimulus. We
argue that current data do not unequivocally support this theory. We present an alternative theory
whereby anticipatory emotions reflect the outcome of a decision process and serve to ready the subject
for new information when making an uncertain response. We test these two accounts, which we refer
to as emotions-as-input and emotions-as-outcome, in a task that allows risky stimuli to be dissociated
from uncertain responses. We find that emotions are associated with responses as opposed to stimuli.
This finding is contrary to the emotions-as-input perspective as it shows that emotions arise from
decision processes.
As cognitive science continues to seek connections between biological and social factors, it
will become increasingly critical to understand the role that emotion and physiology play in
information processing. One central finding in this pursuit is that physiological markers of
emotion (i.e., skin conductance responses; SCRs) occur prior to particular types of choices in
decision-making tasks, suggesting that covert emotions can affect cognition. While a variety
of theories attempt to characterize the causal factors that generate these emotions, as well as
the psychological function of emotions, most extant theories assume that these anticipatory
emotions carry information about the value of particular choices, and thus serve as inputs to
the decision process. In this paper, we develop an alternate account in which emotions arise
from the decision-making process, and carry information about the uncertainty or contextual
novelty associated with a decision. We develop a framework that helps to clarify the functional
role and theory behind these two descriptions of anticipatory emotions, which we refer to as
emotions-as-input and emotions-as-outcome, and suggests ways in which these two views can
be dissociated. We use this framework to understand how emotions affect performance in
choice tasks in general and test the framework’s predictions in a categorization task in
particular.
The canonical example of anticipatory emotions in a cognitive task comes from work on the
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997). In this task, there
are two primary types of stimuli: decks of cards that are associated with overall positive
outcomes and decks that are associated with overall negative outcomes. Importantly, the
individual trial outcomes associated with either stimulus type are variable, and thus are difficult
for subjects to learn. However, the variability in outcome is not constant across stimuli; in
1This work was supported by AFOSR Grant FA9550-04-1-0226 and NSF Grant 0349101 to Bradley C. Love and AFOSR Grant
FA9550-06-0204 and NIH Grant R01 MH077708 to W. Todd Maddox. We thank Frances Fawcett for allowing us to use and adapt her
beetle drawings.
Correspondence concerning this research should be addressed to Tyler Davis; University of Texas at Austin; 1 University Station A8000;
Austin, TX, 78712; E-mail: thdavis@mail.utexas.edu.
NIH Public Access
Author Manuscript
Cognition. Author manuscript.
Published in final edited form as:
Cognition. 2009 July ; 112(1): 195–200. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.04.002.
N
I
H
-
P
A
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
 
M
a
n
u
s
c
r
i
p
t
N
I
H
-
P
A
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
 
M
a
n
u
s
c
r
i
p
t
N
I
H
-
P
A
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
 
M
a
n
u
s
c
r
i
p
tstandard versions of the task the negative decks are appreciably more variable and produce
large rewards as well as large losses.
The key finding in this task is that neurologically intact subjects show increased skin
conductance responses (SCRs) prior to making choices involving the negative stimuli
(Bechara, et al., 1997). Because SCR has historically been used as an indicator of emotion
(Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2000) and patients with damage to putative emotional centers, such
as the amygdala (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999) and ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (ibid., Bechara et al., 1996; for review see Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2000), fail to
exhibit these responses and make poor choices, SCR is considered to be indicative of emotional
involvement in the decision process. While no physiological measurement can capture the
subjective quality of emotional experience, we will refer to these SCRs as markers of emotion
throughout the paper for consistency with this literature.
In terms of our dichotomy, many interpretations of these SCRs conform to the emotions-as-
input perspective (e.g., the Somatic Marker Hypothesis; SMH; Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio,
1991; see Figure 1, for an outline of both perspectives). This account posits that emotion
contributes to decision-making on a trial-by-trial basis by providing information about the
value associated with a particular stimulus (Damasio, 1994;Loewenstein, Hsee, & Welch,
2001;Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & Macgregor, 2004). For example, in the standard IGT,
anticipatory emotions are said to provide a marker of the value of a choice by triggering the
negative feelings that were previously experienced during encounters with the stimulus (e.g.,
during monetary loss or negative feedback) and “act as covert biases on the circuits that support
processes of cognitive evaluation and reasoning" (Bechara, et al., 1997, p. 1294). The
psychological role of anticipatory emotions from an emotions-as-input perspective is to drive
decision-making performance in cases of uncertainty, prior to subjects’ conceptual mastery of
the task (Bechara, et al., 1997; but see Maia & McClelland, 2004). Importantly, anticipatory
emotions, from this perspective, do not depend on any subjective beliefs or explicit decision
processes, and arise from early sensory processing of the stimuli.
An alternate formulation holds that emotions arise from the outcome of a decision process.
According to the emotions-as-outcome view, people in choice tasks experience fluctuations in
anticipation when confronted with uncertain stimulus-outcome contingencies, such as those
present (particularly for the negative decks) in the IGT. While not the dominant view in research
exploring emotion and choice, there are a variety of examples of this type of theory in the
broader literature. One example is the locus coeruleus – norepinephrine theory advanced by
Aston-Jones and colleagues (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Nieuewnhuis, Aston-Jones, &
Cohen, 2005). This theory suggests that when the outcome of a comparator process indicates
that a motivationally significant stimulus is present, a phasic burst of norepinephrine is
delivered via connections from the locus coerulius to attentional regions of the brain to enhance
subsequent processing of the stimulus. This burst of arousal can be likened to the Sokolovian
orienting response (Sokolov, 1966; Sokolov, Spinks, Naatane, & Lyytinen, 2002) in that it
indicates a state of information readiness. A number of studies suggest that these kinds of
responses may be crucial to enhancing an organism’s ability to learn (Love & Gureckis, 2007;
Ranganath & Rainer, 2003; Yu & Dayan 2005) when their internal representations are
insufficient to cope with contingencies present in the current environment.
Interestingly, for several reasons, the evidence is largely equivocal between the emotions-as-
input and emotions-as-outcome views. First, when using a gambling task, it is difficult to
determine whether choices made from particular decks are the result of implicit (or explicit)
beliefs about the value (risk, etc.) of the deck or are exploratory (i.e., information gathering).
Thus, it is difficult to decide whether anticipatory emotions reflect markers that code the value
of a particular stimulus (emotions-as-input), or the outcome of a decision process involving a
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tsignificant or uncertain choice (emotions-as-output). Second, because emotions-as-input
theories are able to account for increased SCRs attributable to either positive or negative
economic valence (see Tomb, Hauser, Deldin & Caramazza, 2002 and reply Damasio, Bechara,
& Damasio, 2002), when SCR is correlated with stimuli for which there is more uncertainty,
the two views predict the same direction of effect. In the following, we introduce a rule-plus-
exception category learning task (i.e., Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995; Exp. 3) that can be used to
address some of these problems by enabling examination of a subject’s uncertainty about
responses apart from the risk associated with the stimuli themselves.
Rule-plus-exception tasks are typically used to test formal category learning theories
predictions for learning and recognition memory performance (Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995;
Sakamoto & Love, 2004; 2006). In these experiments, subjects learn through trial-by-trial
feedback to place each item into one of two categories based on its perceptual characteristics.
The majority of items in rule-plus-exception tasks are rule-following and can be categorized
based on their feature instantiation on a single rule-relevant dimension. Two items (one per
category) are exceptions to this rule, because these items exhibit features consistent with the
contrasting category. Exception items are associated with a larger numbers of errors and are
more difficult to learn in comparison to the rule-following items. An advantage of rule-plus-
exception tasks is that they mirror the structure of many real world categories. For example,
animals that have wings can often be classified as birds based solely on this feature, but some
animals that have wings (e.g., bats) are exceptions to this rule.
While there is no economic valence in a rule-plus-exception task, exception items are more
risky because of the high number of errors that subjects make during learning. Thus, one
hypothesis, derived from the emotions-as-input account, is that emotional responses, as
measured by larger magnitude SCRs, will be associated with exception items independent of
how subjects classify them. This is directly analogous to the description of anticipatory
emotions in gambling tasks from an emotions-as-input perspective; emotions become
associated with items that produce negative feedback and these emotions are re-experienced
when the items are encountered, independent of the subject’s beliefs about the stimuli (Bechara,
et al., 1997).
A second hypothesis, based on the emotions-as-outcome alternative, is that there should be
larger magnitude SCRs when subjects make exception responses (irrespective of the item).
According to the emotions-as-outcome view, because exception items are rarer, difficult to
learn, and contextually novel, when a subject believes that an exception may be present, there
should be a phasic increase in arousal.
Method
Subjects
Forty-four students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at the University of Texas
at Austin participated in the experiment for course credit.
Stimuli
Stimuli depicted beetles that varied along five perceptual dimensions (see Figure 2). Stimuli
were presented in the center of the computer screen on a white background along with two
black rectangles on the left side of the screen that were labeled “Hole L” and “Hole K.”
Design
Subjects were trained in a rule-plus-exception category learning task based on Experiment 3
in Palmeri & Nosofsky (1995). The abstract category structure is shown in Table 1 (see Figure
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t2 for physical dimensions). The majority of the items (L2–L8 & K2–K8) are rule-following
items, and can be classified correctly based on the value of the first dimension (denoted in
Table 1 as a 1 for category L and 2 for category K). The other two items (L1 & K2) are
exceptions that do not exhibit the modal category value on the first dimension. The mapping
of each abstract dimension to a physical dimension was randomized for each subject. Subjects
were trained on this stimulus set for 20 blocks. Each block involved the presentation of each
stimulus in a random order.
Procedure
Subjects were encouraged to use a rule-plus-exception strategy. Instructions indicated the rule-
relevant dimension and encouraged memorization of the exceptions to the rule. Subjects were
instructed to remain as still as possible, and skin conductance was recorded from the fingertips
of their non-dominant hand for the entire experiment.
On each trial, a stimulus was presented and subjects were asked to assign it to its respective
category. Subjects were instructed to think about this decision and respond freely using keys
L or K whenever the words “Respond Now” appeared on the screen. The duration from stimulus
onset to the respond prompt was decided randomly and ranged from 2–6 seconds in 1-second
intervals (mean=3). After responding, corrective feedback was provided using the same
variable duration parameters.
Analysis
Individual SCRs were extracted from the skin conductance time series using an algorithm that
allows for isolation of overlapping SCRs (Alexander, et al. 2005). Only SCRs exceeding .05
µMho’s were retained (Boucsein, 1992). Anticipatory SCR magnitudes were calculated for
each item/response combination for each subject by using the mean maximum amplitude SCR
occurring one second after stimulus onset up until the feedback was delivered or zero, if no
SCR was present. SCR magnitude was log transformed to remove skewness (log+1; Venables
& Christie, 1980), and standardized within subjects (Ben-Shakhar, 1985). To avoid task novelty
effects, the first block of data from each subject was removed from magnitude calculations.
Two subjects were removed from further analysis for making no correct exception responses
after the first block. Their removal did not affect the nature of the results.
Results and Discussion
The behavioral results replicated previous findings from rule-plus-exception studies. Subjects
were more accurate on rule-following items (.92; SD = .0851) than on exception items (.46;
SD = .289), t(41) = 10.014, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.174. Importantly, for the SCR analyses
that follow, exceptions proved more risky and difficult to learn.
The primary test of interest was whether the factors item (exception or rule-following) or
response (exception or rule-following) were significant predictors of anticipatory SCRs. To
foreshadow, the results were consistent with the emotions-as-outcome account -- only the
response factor was significant when both response and item factors were considered
simultaneously.
The anticipatory SCR means for each item by response combination are shown in Table 2 and
plotted in Figure 3. As predicted by an emotions-as-outcome account, there was a significant
effect of response, F(1,41) = 9.707, p = .003, ηp
2 = .191. Contrary to an emotions-as-input
account, the effect of item was not significant, F(1,41) = .0004, n.s., ηp
2 < .001, nor did it
interact with the response factor, F(1,41) = .007, n.s., ηp
2 < .001. Consistent with the hypothesis
that the SCRs signal attentional processes that aid in learning, subjects who performed better
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tin the task exhibited a larger difference in anticipatory SCRs between exception and rule-
following responses (0.158 ; SD = .263) in comparison to subjects who performed poorly (.
003 ; SD = .168), yielding a marginally significant interaction between the response and
learning status (learners vs. nonlearners2) factors, F(1,40) = 3.989, p = 0.053, ηp
2 = .091.
These results clearly show that anticipatory SCR is governed by response type and is not strictly
stimulus bound. The unique characteristics of our design allow for this conclusion to be drawn.
Previous studies, such as those involving gambling tasks, do not allow for within-subject
magnitude scores for item by response combinations and instead aggregate over items (e.g.,
positive vs. negative decks). Interestingly, analyzing our data using the logic of these designs
yields a different and misleading view of our results. When the item factor is considered alone,
it yields a significant result, t(41) = 2.102, p = .042, d= .455, and in the direction predicted by
the emotions-as-input account (exceptions= −0.021, rule-following= −0.093). This
underscores the value of being able to separate the outcome of subjects’ decision processes
from the stimuli themselves as is possible in the present experiment.
Although our theoretical focus is not on feedback SCRs, our findings are in accord with
previous results from gambling tasks. Subjects who exhibit higher SCRs to negative
feedback3 (Suzuki, Hirota, Takasawa, & Shigemasu, 2003) tend to exhibit better performance.
Thus, while there are potentially critical differences between the present task and gambling
tasks in what constitutes feedback (monetary gain/loss in gambling tasks vs. corrective
feedback in present task) and the overall task goal (learning the value of choices in gambling
tasks vs. learning category assignment in present task), the data support the conclusion that
both procedures tap similar underlying mechanisms. Indeed, had we not separated anticipatory
SCR’s by subjects’ responses, all of the present analysis would have been consistent with the
emotions-as-input hypothesis and related findings involving gambling tasks.
Overall, our results are consistent with the emotions-as-outcome hypothesis; when anticipatory
SCRs were examined with respect to response and item factors simultaneously, only response
was significant. This is inconsistent with the basic tenets of emotions-as-input theories, which
suggest that implicit emotional markers arise prior to, and aid in the decision process. Instead,
in this task, anticipatory emotions arise interactively with the decision process or after the
decision of how to respond has been made.
Our framework presents two rather constrained hypotheses about the role of emotion in
decision-making. We have followed other authors (e.g., Maia & McClelland, 2004; Dunn, et
al., 2006) and early work on SMH (Bechara, et al., 1997) in describing the emotion-as-input
perspective as being a critical feature of SMH, and restricting SMH to positing that SCRs
represent covert markers of emotion that arise prior to the development of subjective beliefs
about the stimuli. However, given the breadth of SMH theory, it is likely that both emotion-
as-input and emotion-as-outcome could be accommodated if SMH were defined broadly.
Indeed, Figure 1 is adapted from a diagram illustrating SMH (Bechara, et al., 1997) and is able
to support both perspectives. In this sense, our framework could be thought of as examining
two empirically separable claims of SMH, and, thus, not a refutation of the theory as a whole.
In this spirit, it is worthwhile to examine different possibilities for how emotion could influence
decision making within this framework, and how they relate to the present task. One way that
emotions-as-outcome processes could impact trial-by-trial decision-making is by increasing
attention on uncertain trials to facilitate the processing of information relevant to choosing
2Learners were subjects achieving greater than 50% accuracy in exception classification during the final five blocks of learning.
3Learners exhibited significantly higher magnitude SCR’s for incorrect feedback (0.834; SD = .579) in comparison to non-learners (0.301;
SD = .267); Welch’s t(39.873)=4.073, p < .001, d=1.180.
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tbetween competing options. This is illustrated in Figure 1 as the connection between emotion
and decision processes. Another possibility is that subjects could develop a rule that whenever
they are uncertain about a stimulus (which we suggest produces an SCR), they choose to
classify it as an exception. In terms of Figure 1, this would be the connection between emotion
and reasoning strategies. While emotion in these examples could be described as an ‘input’ it
is critically different from the role of emotion in the emotions-as-input perspective; it does not
carry information about the feedback or value previously associated with the stimulus per se.
Still, in other cases, it is possible that emotions could operate in ways consistent with an
emotion-as-input perspective. The present task involved rather brief training. Perhaps with
extended training, emotions can become associated with stimuli and drive responding without
cognition mediating. This proposal is close to ideas underlying Pavlovian conditioning. One
direction for future research is examining the emotions-as-input and emotions-as-outcome
perspectives in a variety of contexts to assess whether they are incompatible and whether both
can operate depending on situational demands.
Another important direction for future research is to better approximate the continuous nature
of real world decision making. In the laboratory, discrete trial tasks can be designed that isolate
different aspects of the decision process, but outside the laboratory decisions are continuously
made about objects. Our description of the emotion-as-outcome perspective anticipates this
dynamic quality of behavior by suggesting ways in which individual decisions can give rise
to processes that impact other decisions later in the trial or within the task. Approaching the
study of emotions in decision making from an ecologically valid perspective will help to clarify
issues, such as how and when emotions arising from the outcome of one decision process may
serve as inputs to another.
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tFigure 1.
Diagram illustrating the differences between the emotion-as-input and emotionas-outcome
perspectives (adapted from Bechara, et al., 1997). The dashed line reflects the key feature of
the emotion-as-input view; emotions arise directly from sensory processing of the stimulus
and can affect responses unmediated by cognitive aspects of the decision process. Because
emotions can by-pass the cognitive aspects of the decision process, they are interpreted, within
the emotion-as-input perspective, as markers of value. The thick, solid line reflects the key
feature of the emotion-as-outcome view; emotions arise from a decision about how to
categorize the stimulus. Emotions from this perspective are interpreted as attentional
mechanisms that do not carry information about value per se, but can, for example, facilitate
the processing of value judgments. The other thin solid arrows represent pathways that are
available to either perspective.
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Two representative stimuli from the experiment that have opposite feature instantiations on
each dimension. The beetle stimuli varied in terms of five dimensions: eye color (red or green),
legs (thin or thick), antennae (spindly or fuzzy), mandibles (pointy or round), and tail (triangular
or oval).
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tFigure 3.
Anticipatory SCR Magnitude (std. score). Standard scores are z-scores computed within
subjects from the log-transformed, trial-by-trial, SCR magnitude.
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Table 1
Abstract category structures are shown. Each numeric value (1 or 2) stands for a feature instantiation. The five columns
denote the five stimulus dimensions. Each row stands for a unique stimulus. The rule-relevant dimension is the first
dimension; Most hole L beetles have a 1 on the first dimension whereas most hole K beetles have a 2. The first two
stimuli in each column are therefore the exceptions.
Stimulus # Hole L Hole K
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
3 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2
4 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1
5 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2
6 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1
7 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
8 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
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